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The politics of nationalism and white racism in the UK 
 
 
The rise of populist nationalism in many parts of the developed world testifies to the resurgence of 
fears around intensified immigration and the renewed power of racism. Currents of thoughts 
arguing only a few years ago for a ‘post-racial’ perspective on contemporary social and political 
dynamics (e.g. D’Souza 1995, Mirza 2010) - which were anyways never very convincing (see Winant 
2004; Hesse 2011; St Louis 2015; Murji and Solomos 2015; Redclift 2014; Bhatt 2016) – look dated in 
this current context. In the American case, racism has been identified as central to Donald Trump’s 
election as president in 2016 (Wood 2017), and in the British case, racism and more particularly anti-
immigrant sentiment, was a key feature of the Brexit referendum vote (see Bhambra in this issue). 
This seems to reflect the fact that in the UK, attitude surveys apparently shows a revival of racist 
sentiment in the UK in the period after 2001 and the onset of the so called ‘war on terror’. This 
marks a turning point from the end of a steady decline in the proportion of Britons recognising 
‘some level of prejudice’ during the last two decades of the 20th century. 40% of Britons claimed they 
had some level of prejudice in 1988 which fell quite markedly to 25% on the eve of the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. However, since this moment, claimed levels of prejudice 
have risen again to nearly 40% by 2011i.  
It has become common to see this revival of racism as driven by disadvantaged white populations. 
This is an argument which Fassin (2015: 240) has emphasised in the French case, quoting Beaud and 
Pialoux (2006) who argue that ‘working class racism plays a major role in making those who express 
identify as white, French workers – racial identification compensating through its symbolic dividends 
the strong devaluation of working class identity’. On the face of it, there is survey evidence 
suggesting that this is also the case in the UK. The British Social Attitudes Survey shows that until 
2000, professionals, employers and managers were as likely to admit ‘some level of prejudice’ 
compared to skilled and unskilled manual workers. However by 2013 a clear class difference has 
opened, with overt prejudice declining amongst professionals and managers (from around 33% in 
1991 to 20% in 2013), but considerably increasing amongst the working classes: indeed it had 
doubled in extent (from 20% to 41%) amongst unskilled manual workers in this same period. These 
observations give a strong grounding for appealing to a class-centric interpretation of a revanchist 
racism, in which whites in those who have lost ground in recent years are increasingly articulating a 
racist and nationalist response to their relative loss of status and position.  
Our paper disputes this view through dissecting the relationship between nationalist and racist 
sentiment amongst a cohort of late middle aged white Britons. Rather than seeing racism as a 
product of the ‘left behind’ white working class, we emphasise the continued power of ‘imperial 
nationalism’ amongst economically advantaged white Britons, and contrast this with the anti-
establishment nationalism of the most disadvantaged which need not have strong racist overtones. 
We draw attention to the inter-twining of racism with other social and economic inequalities is 
intense and recognise the potential to generate increasingly visceral and volatile forms of political 
identification. We thus insist that the resurgence of racism and nationalism needs to be understood 
in terms of the context of accumulating inequalities and multiple axes of domination.   
Our crucial methodological resource involves using a multi-method research design, in which survey 
evidence can be supplemented with linked qualitative interviews. This is vital because it is well 
attested that survey evidence alone can give misleading impressions of racist and nationalist views. 
Declining levels of apparent racist sentiment might be due to a greater awareness amongst 
respondents that such views are illegitimate to raise in public. Furthermore, as Bobo (2011, see also 
Bobo et al 2015)) has shown in the American case, and as Redclift (2015), and Kapoor (2013), and 
Vullavan and Kapoor (2015) reflect in the British context, declining levels of overt ‘Jim Crow-like’ 
white racism may be replaced by neo-liberal and ‘performative’ modes of racism which are not so 
easily manifested in survey responses. We deal with this issue by linking survey responses from the 
National Child Development Study (one of the most famous in the world, see Pearson 2015) to 220 
qualitative accounts gathered with a sub-sample of panel members. We thus address the major 
sampling problem that besets research using qualitative interviews, that it is hard to establish the 
representativeness of qualitative respondents when these are sampled through ad hoc sample 
frames. By using NCDS panel survey data to cluster respondents, we can rigorously compare not only 
their survey responses, but also the qualitative accounts from contrasting groups.  Although these 
qualitative interviews were conducted in 2008, well before the Brexit vote and the recent escalation 
of nationalist populism, we turn this to our analytical advantage by reflecting on the longer term 
trajectory of nationalist and racist beliefs, rather than the more immediate responses from the 
Brexit campaign itself.  
After showing how we theoretically relate the analysis of racial boundaries to multi-dimensional 
analysis of social inequality in Section 1, we examine three survey questions probing the extent of 
racism using the British National Child Development Study in Section 2.  Very few, indeed hardly any 
cohort members were strongly and overtly racist in 2008 if this is measured through responses to 
direct questions asking for strong assent to racist propositions (or strong disavowal of anti-racist 
propositions). A much larger proportion, but still a minority of the cohort members are committed 
to racial equity as a universal ideal. The majority of the cohort members were divided between 
those weakly, or perhaps pragmatically, racist or non-racist views in 2008. It is this ‘weak anti-racism’ 
(and to a lesser extent, ‘weak racism’) which concerns us here. Much of the public debate operates 
at a ‘universal’ level which slides past these more mundane and contextualised positions. It is vital to 
understand better the majority of cohort members who have these ambivalent, or weakly anti-racist 
views.   
In Section 3 we begin to explore how far different kinds of racist and anti-racist views are associated 
with social position by conducting a multiple correspondence analysis of the NCDS, using measures 
of economic and cultural capital to differentiate cohort members. We show, in line with many other 
studies, that there is a powerful divide amongst this cohort of Britons according to these criteria. We 
also show that there is only a modest association of the survey based questions on racism and anti-
racist questions compared to other kinds of attitudes which are more starkly differentiated: hence 
we resist a simple ‘class-centric’ approach.  
In section 4 we go onto to use the qualitative interviews amongst the most advantaged and 
disadvantaged members of the NCDS to further examine what we term the ‘national repertoires’ of 
white respondents with differing amounts of economic and cultural capital. Here we make a striking 
discovery: there is a clear differentiation between an imperial nationalism still evident amongst 
more advantaged white Britons, in which racism can be manifested within the context of firm beliefs 
about British supremacy, and what we term ‘anti-establishment nationalism’ found amongst the 
disadvantaged, in which there is no emphasis about British supremacy but a more personal and 
sensuous invocations of the nation. Whereas imperial discourses focus on Britain as world ‘leader’, 
‘anti-establishment’ nationalism is much more associated with more ‘personal’ and sensuous 
Scottish, English, Welsh and Irish identities. Our suggestion is therefore that we need to distinguish 
two very different kinds of nationalist identities, which can intersect, as they very clearly did in the 
EU Brexit campaign, but also have different dynamics, and differing potential for racist mobilisation. 
We thus insist on marked instabilities evident amongst nationalist and racist positions. 
Our analysis of national repertoires leads us to add a further complication since we detect a third 
kind of repertoire, emphasising ‘mastery’ over multi-cultural issues, notably through managerial and 
professional authority, or personal experiences of migration. This association might have the 
unintended consequence of feeding into wider social and economic inequalities, raising the prospect 
that anti-establishment feeling from those who are marginalised may also react against what are 
seen to be managerial impositions. They also demonstrate how embedded nationalist and racist 
views are within multiple axes of inequality. This leads to the potential for highly toxic mix of 
attitudes and visceral political responses. 
 
 1: The politics of contemporary racism & nationalism 
Much research in the analysis of race and ethnic divisions has focused on the systematic forces 
which have discriminated against minorities, with issues of recognition and identity often at the fore. 
A crucial force here has been the power of critical race theory (e.g. Delgado and Stefanic 2001) to 
expose the implicit liberal assumptions about the racialised ‘white’ norms and practices which are 
enshrined at the heart of Western liberal democracies. Rather than being a contingent and partial 
exception to liberal democratic and free-market practices, racist assumptions are seen to 
underscore the formation of national bodies themselves, famously identified by Goldberg (2002) as  
‘the racial state’. Critical race theory has emphasised the need not to focus just on marginalised 
ethnic and racial minorities, but also on the formation and reproduction of racial privilege by 
majority (or sometimes, minority) white groups, so that ‘whiteness’ and the racist practices and 
values associated with it, are placed centre stage (generally, Roediger 1997; Hughey 2015). This also 
involves a recognition of how racial hierarchies are embedded in the formation of modern states, to 
the imperial projects of the Western powers, and to the continuing hegemony of the ‘global north’ 
(e.g. Chakrabarty 2009, Bhambra 2014).   
As recently noted by Vullamy and Kapoor (2016), alongside Virdee (2010), and Murji and Solomos 
(2016), this approach has not been strongly informed by political economy. This is true despite the 
long term significance of Marxist theory for the analysis of race and ethnicity. Here, the influence of 
post-structuralism, which provided a powerful critique of liberal ‘colour blind egalitarianism’ 
(Gallagher 2015), has detracted attention from the implications of the striking growth of economic 
inequality which has been emphasised by economists such as Atkinson (2015), Piketty (2014), and 
Stiglitz (2012). This stand-off is compounded by the fact that this important work by economists has 
rarely focused specifically on how racial and ethnic inequalities may be enhanced by growing 
economic inequalities (for an exception in the American case, see Shapiro 2017).  
The same problem also exists regarding the rise of what is sometimes called ‘cultural class analysis’ 
(e.g. Bennett et al 2009; Atkinson 2015, 2017, Savage et al 2015). This body of work has had 
considerable success in bringing class back into sociological analysis through recognising the power 
of cultural, as well as economic, capital in driving social class divisions. However, it has not placed 
racial inequalities at the centre of its focus. (There is a striking contrast with the study of gender 
which has been much more elaborated from within this current, notably because of the influence of 
Bourdieusian currents on feminist research, see e.g. Adkins and Skeggs 2003). This lack of 
engagement of questions of race within cultural class analysis is one factor which might have led 
some sociologists to express concern about the ‘whitening’ of sociology’s agenda (e.g. Bhatt 2016). 
Nonetheless, we content that scholars of racial and ethnic divisions have actually similar ways of 
thinking to those working within ‘cultural class analysis’. There is an overlapping set of concerns 
about ‘racialisation’, on ‘racial formation’, and on ‘class formation’, in which the stress is on the 
historically contingent ways in which social boundaries (of race, class, etc) are constructed, 
contested, and mobilised. This line of thinking is thus allied to a sensitivity to the way that ‘racial 
formations’ (Omi and Winant 2014) operate to mark powerful social, cultural and political 
boundaries. There is a similar concern to criticise the essentialisation and reification of both racial 
and class categories, and instead to insist on the historical specificity of the forms in which social 
groups are defined. In the case of racial and ethnic studies, the work of Robert Miles, and his refusal 
of the concept of race but his emphasis on how ‘race’ is redefined, has its counterpart in the 
Bourdieusian insistence that classes are not objective or structural phenomenon but are formed out 
of struggles within contested and multiplex fields (see e.g. Savage et al 2015).   
The possible congruence of interests, in which the comparative analysis of boundaries which can be 
seen to embody class and racial characteristics - as well as intersectionalities with gender – is 
apparent in the work of Michele Lamont (2016) and her collaborators, in their study of racial 
boundaries in US, Brazil, and South Africa. We find the multidimensional analysis of inequality 
associated with the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu as a powerful tool, even though it has rarely 
influenced debates about race and ethnicity in the UK. It is striking that whereas in his French 
context, Bourdieu is not seen as specifically concerned with class, its use in the Anglophone ‘cultural 
class analysis’ tradition has led to a certain pigeonholing of it as mainly about class, or indeed mainly 
about ‘lifestyles’ and consumption rather than more fundamental economic and political divides. 
However, we believe that the forms of ‘mastery’ and ‘domination’ with Bourdieu places at the heart 
of his analysis allows an emphasis on the intersectionalities of race and ethnicity with other divides.  
An important starting point here is Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital. This has rarely been 
examined directly with respect to issues of race and ethnicity, though it has underpinned much of 
the recent revival of class analysis (see notably Bennett et al 2009). We believe that the concept of 
cultural capital has considerable potential in exposing how forms of privilege can be associated with 
whiteness and implicit racism. This is because the divide between ‘experts’ (with cultural capital) and 
the ‘people’ is rooted in fundamental inequalities of cultural capital which privileges those with the 
‘right’ cultural attributes, and discriminates against those who lack them. Entrenched inequalities in 
educational outcomes differentiate between pupils who feel ‘at home’ in school, where their 
families encourage reading, theatre and museum going , get better qualifications which gives them 
advantages in employment. This can be linked to an understanding of how forms of racial privilege 
are also associated with cultural capital. 
One of the important contributions here is by the Australian anthropologist Ghassan Hage (2004) 
who demonstrated how the implicit values of whiteness placed immigrant and minority 
communities at a disadvantage in the Australian context. He thus saw the possession of cultural 
capital as involving a familiarity with the ‘national’ cultural canon, the cultural repertoires associated 
with ‘national belonging’. Bennett et al (2009) found plenty of evidence for this process in the UK 
when many older generation ethnic minorities which felt ill at ease in mainstream British culture, 
given its imperial, white and Christian aspects. Although younger minorities felt less marginalised, 
there was still a keen sense of being an ‘outsider’ and not fully ‘fitting in’.   
This sense of cultural capital as articulating a mode of Eurocentric ‘whiteness’ might be undergoing 
change. Bourdieu’s own defining study of cultural capital in France conducted during the 1970s, 
focused nearly entirely on French people’s appreciation of white French composers, writers, artists 
and musicians. The kind of cultural capital he measured was therefore strongly Eurocentric, with no 
reference points from other parts of the globe. When Bourdieu wrote Distinction, he rather assumed 
that these French reference points, combined with a few others from the European high culture 
tradition, comprised cultural capital. However, especially for younger people, there is now a strong 
sense of detachment from what are seen as the tired, rather staid, ’British’ canon. Considerable 
research has shown that extensive cultural change associated with globalisation, migration, and the 
proliferation of media platforms, especially digital ones, has proliferated cultural divisions, with 
forms of cosmopolitanism becoming a form of cultural capital. Here, the ‘cosmopolitan’ tastes of the 
educated middle classes are not as ‘global’ as they might assume and can new embody forms of 
‘whiteness’. It follows that to recognise the significance of racism we need to question the liberal 
assumptions of white cosmopolitans. Bennett et al (2009) showed that younger white well educated 
Britons were attracted to predominantly Anglophone, especially American media genres. TV 
programmes such as The Wire, Friends, or Cheers would be mentioned enthusiastically, and more 
recently the popularity of Scandinavian noir also testifies to the popularity of a kind of ‘cosmopolitan 
whiteness’ to the white British middle classes. Even when asked directly, white British respondents 
who identify themselves as cosmopolitan still find it hard to name specific artists, musicians, or film 
makers from Africa, South America or Asia. In short, the lure of cosmopolitanism is a long way from 
creating a genuinely level cultural playing field across the globe, and continues to marginalise 
cultural production from outside dominant, white, capitalist nations (see the discussion in Savage et 
al 2010).  
One possible response to this cosmopolitan remaking of cultural capital is that those who lack 
economic and cultural capital might be more attracted towards nationalist repertoires. In his 
important study of the emerging ‘European field’, Fligstein (2009) argued that because professionals 
and managers across Europe felt confident in operating at a European level, ethnic majority working 
class populations increasingly took up nationalist positons as ‘theirs’. In the European studies 
discussed by Prieur and Savage (2011; 2013), this opposition between nationalist oriented cultural 
practices amongst the disadvantaged compared to more cosmopolitan orientation amongst those 
privileged with economic and cultural capital was a major finding across most European nations. This 
tension has been identified as a significant factor in the Brexit referendum in the UK. We can see, 
therefore, that nationalism intertwines with forms of racism and takes on an intensifying role in a 
situation of entrenched inequalities, so that racism is implicated in growing divisions associated with 
economic and cultural capital. This is the issue we now turn to assess.  
 
2: Racism from the National Child Development Study, 2008 
The NCDS is the ‘gold standard’ panel study in the UK, based on a comprehensive study of all babies 
born in the UK in a single week in 1958. These have then been followed up at regular intervals, so 
creating a remarkably rich data assemblage of panel members as they age. The NCDS data set is one 
of the most studied of any in the world, and forms the basis of many benchmark studies, including 
influential studies of social mobility (e.g. Blanden et al 2004; Bukodi et al 2016). However, our use of 
the data here is original for two reasons: firstly we are taking advantage of a qualitative booster 
study on 220 of the NCDS panel members, and secondly for focusing specifically on questions of 
racism and national identity, which have not been previously focused upon.  
We need to recognise that because the NCDS cohort are of the same age, it is not a representative 
sample of the British population. However, for our purposes, given that the demographic of the later 
middle aged have been identified as central to the Brexit vote, this is an excellent test case. We 
should also note that NCDS panel members were originally born in Britain in 1958 which might entail 
a bias against immigrants who moved to the UK subsequently. NCDS researchers have sought to 
locate later immigrants who were born in the same week so that they can be added to the panel, but 
it seems unlikely that this could be a consistent or complete process. In fact, the proportion of NCDS 
panel members who are ethnic minority is remarkably small: the ‘ethnic group that cohort members 
see themselves as belonging to’ is only 0.4% Indian; 0.1% Pakistani; 0.1% ‘other Asian’; 0.3% 
Caribbean; 0.1% ‘other black’ and 0.7% ‘other ethnicity’. This is a serious omission, though for our 
purposes of exploring white racism, not an undercutting one.  
We start by considering questionnaire responses, conducted in 2008 when NCDS members had to 
reply to three questions directly eliciting their views on three racist topics. In line with the careful 
reflections of Bobo (2011) and others, we are not taking these responses at face value, and 
recognise they may hide, occlude or distort racist attitudes. But as we will explain, this is still a 
revealing starting point. By focusing on these three questions, rather than adapting the usual 
approach of placing them into wider scales (such as in Inglehart’s post-materialism scale) we can do 
justice to what these questions reveal about racist sentiment.   
 
----- Table 1 about here ------ 
On the face of it Table 1 appears to demonstrate a reasonably strong anti-racist consensus amongst 
NCDS panel members. Only 3.7% agree or strongly agree that they ‘would not want another race as 
my boss’, only 2% would disagree or strongly disagree that they ‘would not mind working with other 
races’, and a slightly higher proportion - but only 5.9% - would disagree or strongly disagree that 
they ‘would not mind if another race moved in next door’. These figures are well below those which 
the British Social Attitudes Survey reported for ‘some level of prejudice’ in the British population. 
They are to this extent, relatively reassuring.  
However, if we look at those who ‘strongly’ agree with the anti-racist, or ‘strongly’ disagree with 
racist proposition, we can also see these are a minority of the sample: 40% strongly disagree that 
they ‘would not want another race as my boss’; 46% strongly agree that they ‘would not mind 
working with other races’, and (only) 25% ‘strongly agree’ that they would not mind if another race 
moved in next door. The stakes of claiming ‘strongly’ rather than ‘merely’ agree is important here. 
We might expect respondents committed to racial equity as such to tick the ‘strongly’ box to 
emphasise their overarching commitment to this principle. Merely ‘agreeing’ is therefore an 
interesting, perhaps even ambivalent response, testifying perhaps to a pragmatic preparedness but 
not ultimate commitment to support an anti-racist view. It might well be consistent for some of 
those who ticked this box to also report to the BSA that they might have ‘some’ degree of prejudice. 
Indeed, the proportion supporting such responses, ranging from 40% to 31% is broadly in line with 
the BSA figures on this score. We might further note that neutral responses are also a significant 
proportion of responses (17.5% to 7.5%), and a further 10.8% of responses are ‘missing’ (a 
proportion similar across all attitude questions which were asked, so not distinctive to these 
questions on racism).  
Therefore, although few respondents avowedly report strongly racist views, a substantial majority 
are not committed to anti-racism as such and use moderate and neutral response categories to 
disavow from an anti-racist position. Generalising, we might suggest that 1-2% of the NCDS panel 
members are clearly and overtly racist; around 30% are clearly committed to racial equity as such, 
and the largest proportion, around two thirds, are positioned with varying degrees of ambivalence 
between these poles. In 2008, this ambivalent group leaned towards anti-racist positions, but it is 
possible that this could shift in different contexts – such as the more recent politics around 
immigration and Brexit. This is the possibility that we explore further below.  
 
3: Racism in social space: an MCA of the NCDS 
So far we have only considered the extent of racist attitudes across the cohort as a whole. We now 
take this analysis further by considering how far these different kinds of racist and anti-racist 
positions are socially differentiated, to see if it is the more disadvantaged panel members who have 
a greater propensity to report racist responses. Following influential models (Bennett et al 2009; 
Prieur and Savage 2011,2013) we used a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to partition 
respondents so that we could assess whether those more or less economic or cultural capital were 
more prone to racist views. 
We used five variables to delineate economic capital, measured from the 2008 wave of the NCDS; 
the number of rooms in home, whether respondents had income from investments, or from rent, 
their total amount of savings, and their weekly pay. These are therefore wide ranging and robust 
measures to assess respondent’s economic capital, and which crucially do not simply use measures 
of income which we argued above need to be supplemented by much richer and multi-dimensional 
measures of accumulation. 
With respect to cultural capital, the NCDS allows us the unusual resource of measuring cultural 
orientations in earlier waves when respondents were children. We used measures of 
institutionalized (Bourdieu 1985) cultural capital in terms of the respondents’ highest academic 
qualification (GHM), as derived from any of the 1991,2000,2004,2008 waves, and embodied cultural 
capital (from the NCDS childhood data) which included the age of father and mother when leaving 
full time education; how often father and mother read books in their spare-time, and whether a 
public library had been used in last 12 months (as a child). It is unusual to be able to use measures 
derived from longitudinal data sources to allow us to select according to the time that we expect 
economic and cultural capitals to be most salient and we see this as a major resource for us. 
The resulting MCA has two axes accounting for 89.5% of the variance. The solution is dominated by a 
first axis accounting for 81.84 % of the variance, but the second axis adds important nuance. 
Interestingly, the variables for cultural capital contribute somewhat more than economic capital to 
both the first (61.7% of the contribution) and second (59.3%) axes. Even so, both axes should be 
interpreted as ‘general’ axes, reflecting interlinked differences in both economic and cultural capital. 
The first, y axis is the crucial differentiator between those at the top with high amounts of both 
cultural and economic capital, and those at the bottom with little. Contrasting respondents placed at 
the bottom and top of these axes will therefore form the key focus of the analysis to come.  
 
------Figure 1 about here ----- 
 
Figure 1 shows that the first, most powerful, y axis clearly distinguishes on the basis of the amount 
of both economic and cultural capital that respondents possess. This is in line with the ‘volume of 
capital’ axis. Those at the top of Figure 1 are those respondents whose parents were in education 
after the age 18 (most usually, therefore, being university graduates), who report high savings and 
weekly pay (in the top 5%), with a higher degree and large homes with over 9 rooms. Somewhat less 
strongly located lower down from the top of this first axis are respondent characteristics such as 
having a degree, having rental and investment income, and parental characteristics such as reading 
books. At the bottom of this first axis lie the inverse values, where respondents have no educational 
qualifications, no savings and investment income, poor income levels, small houses, and their 
parents also had poor educational qualifications and rarely read books.  
The second, much weaker x axis, differentiates between those on the left hand side who tend to 
have high amounts of cultural capital – for instance to have parents who read books, or who were 
well educated - and those on the right who are more likely to have economic capital – in terms of 
higher income and savings. This is a classic ‘composition of capital’ differentiation which Bourdieu 
(1985) emphasises. (Because the NCDS is a panel survey, it does not pick up age divisions, which is 
often associated with these dimensions of capital composition (Bourdieu 1984 Savage et al 2015).   
Let us now consider how different kinds of anti-racist and racist responses are distributed across this 
MCA, in order to assess whether these are separated between those with differing degrees of 
economic and cultural capital. We can superimpose the responses to our three questions on this 
MCA place to see how strongly differentiated they are.  
 
----- Figure 2, 3 and 4 about here ----- 
 
Figures 2-4 show that these questions are somewhat associated with locations in social space - but 
not in a very marked way. Those espousing anti-racist positions tend to be located in those areas of 
the MCA where respondents have higher amounts of capital. However, this is not the main feature 
we want to draw attention to here. What is more telling is that those who strongly agree with the 
anti-racist (or disagree with the racist) proposition are located further away from those who ‘merely’ 
agree (or disagree) with this proposition. Those who ‘merely’ agree to anti-racist views are however 
closely located alongside those who appear to hold the racist position.  
We can put this finding in the following way. We might normally think that the major divide on any 
issue is whether we agree or disagree with a proposition, with a secondary divide being between 
whether we agree or disagree strongly or not. And indeed, for most questions from the NCDS, this 
appears to be the case, as we can see from Figure 5 which plots ellipse from a question asking 
respondents if they feel ‘there is not much difference which political party is in power’. Here we see 
that the ellipses which disagree and strongly disagree with this question are much more closely 
aligned, and are also more separated from the ellipse of those who agree with this proposition.  
However, for questions on racism, the major divide is between those who strongly agree with the 
anti-racist position, or disagree strongly with the racist position, and all other responses. In other 
words, the major contrast is between those with a ‘universalist’ anti-racist position (which is 
associated with those with higher degrees of economic and cultural capital) and all other responses, 
including those with positions which are intermediate and more overtly racist. We find a similar 
picture when we consider responses to the question ‘working people don’t get a fair share of the 
nation’s wealth’ (Figure 6).  
 
----- Figure 5 and 6 about here --- 
Questions on economic equity (as in Figures 5 and 6) are much more differentiated between those 
with differing amounts of economic and cultural capital than are those on racism. But, we have also 
argued that the NCDS questions on attitudes towards racism should not necessarily be read at face 
value. This is why we need to use our qualitative interviews to see what insights they offer.  
To give a frame for selecting contrasting qualitative interviews we cluster the NCDS respondents to 
allow us to systematically sample different groups. Following usual procedures we clustered on all 
dimensions of the MCA which creates a 9 cluster solution, providing us with the most detail, 
especially in terms of differentiation at the ‘bottom’ of social space. The cluster at the bottom of the 
y axis stands out as disenfranchised, scoring low on most capital indicators and also lacking 
occupational codes. It can most readily be contrasted with a cluster on the top right hand side which 
represents those with high amounts of capital in general, and economic capital in particular, and a 
cluster on the top left hand side which also represents those with high amounts of capital, and 
cultural capital in particular. It is the analytical contrasts between these three ‘extreme’ clusters 
which we will focus on in our further analysis, where we will compare the qualitative accounts of 
cluster members.  
 
------ Figure 7 about here ------ 
 
4: Qualitative repertoires of nationalism and racism 
All the selected sub-sample had taken part in the main quantitative study, with the qualitative 
interviews taking place within six months of an individual’s main age 50. The qualitative interviews 
were carried out between November 2008 and August 2009ii. We focus on the transcripts of the 16 
interviews located in the group most deprived of economic and cultural capital, which we 
subsequently will call the ‘disenfranchised’; the 5 interviews of cohort members located in the 
‘economic elite’, and the 14 interviews of cohort members strong in cultural capital, which we will 
call the ‘cultural elite’. We therefore only use 35 of the 220 interviews, which allows us to pull out 
the analytical contrasts between them. If there are no significant differences between these 
‘extreme’ clusters, we can be confident that there are few major partitions amongst the panel 
members as a whole. 
For our purposes we focus especially on how the respondents narrate their detailed life histories and 
also some telling responses to a question about how the respondents reacted to being ‘British’. We 
have pulled out all the references to race and ethnicity in these interviews, and contextualised 
these, where appropriate in the context of their wider life stories. Our analysis revealed a very 
striking differentiation by cluster according to how three repertoires were manifest, with a complete 
separation between the disenfranchised on the one hand, and the two elite clusters on the other, 
and a partial separation between the economic and cultural elite. We will show below how different 
repertoires are associated with contrasting clusters: ‘imperial nationalism’ is associated with the 
cultural and economic elite; ‘managerial multiculturalism’ with the cultural elite, and ‘anti-
establishment nationalism’ is strongly associated with the ‘disenfranchised’ cluster who are low in 
economic and cultural capital.  
 
4a: Imperial nationalism 
Table 2 lists a significant number of cases amongst both the economic and cultural elite which 
reasserts a view of Britain’s ‘greatness’. This was often, though not inevitably, linked to a certain 
ambivalence about responses to racist questions, which could occasionally slide into overt racism. 
Interestingly, those articulating these perspectives were often well educated, highly globally aware 
and had often worked or lived abroad, frequently as part of their managerial careers. In this respect 
they were cosmopolitan, though ultimately they relied on an imperial framing of Britain’s underlying 
‘greatness’ and the need to protect this unique mission. This repertoire clearly problematizes the 
view that liberal views characterise advantaged elites, or is necessarily a sign of narrow nationalistic 
experiences, as we discuss  
----- Table 2 about here ----- 
P479iii is a self-employed, successful electrician, who insisted on British ‘leadership’. Having left 
school at 16, he had worked up through a series of manual jobs, including working as part of a gang, 
which had operated across Europe. He had travelled extensively, and in more recent years had 
developed property, and owned 10 flats at the time of the interview. This extensive cosmopolitan 
experience went along with an emphasis on British ‘leadership’ though he was clearly troubled by 
issues of race, though he talked about these hesitantly, being aware that the subject is ‘delicate’ to 
raise. Scrutinising his survey respondents, we can see that P479 was a Liberal Democrat, who 
‘merely’ rather than strongly agreed with the anti-racist questions.  
P479 was far from being alone in his views. Others subscribing to versions of this imperial vision 
were invariably amongst our ‘elite’ groups and also tended to have a distinctive biographical profile, 
having pursued a linear professional or managerial career, often on the basis of good educational 
achievement. The interviewer’s notes for P394 note that he lived in ‘an affluent residential street in 
a desirable area. The house was large and detached.... The manner of the interviewee is hard to 
describe. He was very straight talking and critical, quite dismissive of anything he doesn’t rate as 
intelligent. He described himself as an ‘intellectual snob’ and had a linear and highly successful 
accounting career. After a school education which spluttered, he realised his forte for numeracy 
skills, and studied economics and accounting at university before moving into the accounting 
profession.  
Qualified with the accountancy exams and you’re made then basically because you’ve got 
the right name behind you…. spent three years travelling around the world which was great, 
you know, ‘cause I did geography so I--, travelling around the world was great……. Three 
years in a factory in London which has shut down.  Moved to (bank), proved to me from the 
start that I didn’t like working in banking, and then did that for two years.  Then worked for 
{firm x) for eight years and moved to where I am now where I’ve been eight, nearly nine 
years. 
Q: Right.  So that first job that you got on graduation really set you up for--? 
A: That’s the only thing which matters, the rest of it’s irrelevant.  The fact that you 
work for the top firm, the sheer fact you’ve got through that selection process means that 
everyone else just accepts, ‘cause it’s not an issue from then.  (P394: emphases ours) 
There is an interesting association here with being in the ‘top firm’, and his insistence that Britain 
was ‘the best’. He also made no bones about his views on being ‘English’.  
Yes we may have to suffer the Scots and the Welsh and the Irish, hmmm, but--, I don’t have 
a problem with people from different nationalities who’ve been brought up here, who speak 
English, who behave like English people, who have the aspirations of English people, have--, 
and live like English people, then that’s no problem whatever their colour of the skin….. If 
they don’t have the same norms then I don’t tend to regard them as British, you know, I’d 
rather kick all them out of the country, but if they conform that’s fine…..  you know, I don’t 
have a problem when Muslim women working with us at all, but they shouldn’t be wearing 
veils in this country, that religious crap should just be got rid of, just like the French ban it, 
you know, it’s just stupid what we’re letting people get away with.  (P394) 
In line with Kapoor and others, we see here a kind of ‘neo-liberal’ racism, which formally does not 
directly discriminate on the basis of ‘skin colour’, but then expects the appropriate performative 
responses. Tellingly, he also ‘merely’ and not strongly agreed with the anti-racist questions.  
This imperial nationalism can easily flip into a nostalgic and reactionary form. P740 was an upwardly 
mobile senior manager working for the Health Service, who strikingly lacked confidence and felt out 
of place. This appeared to colour his attitudes towards being British.  
I think we’ve lost the plot [laughs] basically, yeah…..  The first time I’ve been to {COUNTRY2} 
and I don’t know whether you’ve been there or not but all the families, all--, they’re all 
together.  They go out at night time and they’ve got the little baby in the seat in the bike and 
they’re peddling away and there’s not a bad word to be said by anyone, there’s no rubbish 
on the street…. We were the odd ones out, apparently where we went 95 percent of the 
visitors are {from COUNTRY2}, the other five percent are made up of Brits, Americans, 
Germans, whatever and--, which was nice ‘cause it’s the first time I’ve been abroad when 
there’s not been loads of English yobos there really, spoiling the thing.  And we came back 
here and {WIFE} immediately says, “What country are we in?”  [Laughs] So being British 
doesn’t mean a lot now, I’d love for it to go back to that, the Victorian ways.  (P740, 
emphases ours) 
Here the imperial refrain becomes nostalgic – and hence, potentially something to be reclaimed 
through revanchist nationalist politics. Again, we see how this vision exemplifies a certain kind of 
transnational lifestyle, is not based on a narrow nationalism but rather on extended comparisons of 
different international experiences, all premised on a certain vision of British greatness, albeit in 
danger of being ‘lost’.  
P713 is a telling case. He was very cosmopolitan, having spent a ‘fantastic’ year travelling in the 
United States before starting at university. Having studied politics and economics he had moved into 
banking, and currently worked for an American bank, spending considerable time in the US. He 
planned to retire to another European nation. This still went hand in hand with a patriotic view (see 
Table 2). P713 is the only respondent evoking imperial nationalism who strongly agreed with all the 
questions against racism. He shows that there is no automatic link between imperial nationalism and 
racist views (as elicited in survey responses, at least). But he is the only respondent of this type, and 
his invocation that he was ‘quite proud’ indicates a certain hesitancy lacking amongst the other 
respondents. The strength of these refrains about imperial nationalism amongst our elite clusters 
are an indication that high levels of education, career success, and considerable international 
experience does not, in and of itself, generate a cosmopolitan outlook committed to racial equity. 
Indeed, for most of this sample, international comparisons had actually enhanced an imperial view.   
 
4b: Anti-establishment nationalism 
The attitudes of ‘‘disenfranchised’’ respondents, who lacked economic and cultural capital are very 
different, even though they could be nationalist in a different register. Even though they could be 
seen as epitomising the ‘white working class’, their views contain no trace of imperial visions of 
British greatness. Their evocations of nationalism tend to be ambivalent, and much more personal 
and sensuous, associated with particular feelings and attachments which the nation evokes. (A few 
members of the cultural elite also share these views, as Table 3 shows). There is amongst this group 
a strong latent anti-establishment sentiment, which can cross-fertilise with nationalism. In 2008, this 
feeling is largely dormant, apart from Scottish respondents, but we can anticipate that the targeting 
of the EU – as a kind of ‘establishment’ - by nationalist forces might well have accentuated its 
significance 
 
----- Table 3 about here ----- 
The dominant feelings which nationalism evoked is highly personal, often evoking sensitivity towards 
the landscape, and a primordial vision that the nation is where respondents are necessarily located.  
Table 3 shows that only five of this cluster were strongly patriotic, the majority being much more 
hesitant. Being British is simply a fact of life, leading to a pragmatic patriotism, a feeling that it is 
indelibly part of one’s own individual identity but not something vested with great significance. P5, a 
self-employed building worker put it in these terms 
I think Britain is a nice place, I think as a place it’s--, by the fact that I was born here means 
I’m British so therefore to try and relate to other areas, hmmm, but Britain is Britain, you 
know.  It’s got a lot to offer, I think it’s got definite problems now which there’ll not be a 
quick fix solution to but Britain is Britain, you know. 
 
Q: Do you feel patriotic would you say? 
 
A: Where it--, where it applies, possibly yeah.  But, you know, but I’m not… I think it’s--, 
I think you’re bound to feel patriotic but then again, you know, I think some crazy things go 
on, you know, five guys killed in {COUNTRY8, Asia}, you know, the news headlines and I feel 
that this is such a shame, you know.  Proud of those guys because they’re out there fighting 
a cause which they shouldn’t be there, you know…. (P5) 
5 crisply articulates his personal vision of being British, without evoking any imperial pretensions. He 
is British pragmatically, it is where he was born, he has no control over this, and he disavows any 
militaristic ventures. In several cases this anti-establishment ethos trumps a nationalist one. As Table 
3 shows, for both P430 and P441 this is a reaction against the Royal Family, for P5 it is a reaction 
against British troops being sent to fight ‘where they shouldn’t be’. This is a more defensive account 
of nationalism, in which the nation is an extension of home and not a vehicle of imperial greatness 
The major exception to these kinds of subdued statements are four out of the eight Scottish 
respondents from this cluster who were vehement in their Scottishness. In every case they made 
their anti-English feelings very clear. Scottish nationalist identity was a resource which was signally 
absent for the English and Welsh respondents, because Scottishness could be a means of claiming an 
‘anti-establishment’ identity directed against the English or Britain more generally. This was a 
nationalism of the underdog, which could also be very personal.   
P633, a university administrator married to a self-employed manual worker had a clear Scottish, 
anti-British feeling, which was also rooted in her sense of place, kinship, and family 
I’m Scottish, definitely, I wouldn’t say British.  I hate when you fill in these forms and they’ve 
no got a Scottish slot.  [laughs]… I’d rather write Scottish, aye, definitely.  
Q: Do you know what it is that gives you a strong sense of being Scottish? 
A: I think my dad’s side, because he comes from the {PLACE10}, but it’s all Dad’s 
stories.  I don’t know much about my mum’s stories.  She was an only child and she never--, 
no, we didn’t know.  {SISTER1} took her to her house just before she died, down in 
{PLACE32}, but I think it will be from my dad’s side and we always had Hogmanay parties and 
he always had to sing and I hated it.  Aye, no, I’m Scottish.  (P633) 
Compared to our elite respondents, this evocation is more personal, being allied to kinship 
networks, and also more passionate, not being allied to a clear conception of imperial greatness – 
indeed the rejection of Britishness suggests an anti-imperial conception. Indeed, for other 
respondents this anti-establishment identity ran deeper, also being affiliated to the passionate 
concern to identify with Scotland. P189 was very articulate about his feelings that Scotland had been 
‘sold out’ by its leaders 
Darling and Brown are Scotsmen in London and Scotsmen on the make in London basically.  I 
find them… very traitorous really, to use not too strong a word.  Rather than all these parts 
of--, an independent Scotland they’re trying to demolish it so we’ll end up in the union 
because we’ve got nowhere else to go, the unionist propaganda for 300 years has told the 
Scottish people you’re too small, too stupid and too dumb to run your own affairs, there is 
nowhere comparable in the world that would allow the big country next door to run us.  
There’s nowhere in the world that has discovered oil and become poorer apart from 
Scotland (P189) 
Interestingly, P189 actually agreed with the proposition that he would not want another race for his 
boss, his anti-establishment nationalist leanings also here being associated with open racism.  
However, Scottish nationalism was articulated in a very different way from any kind of nationalist 
identity amongst out sample, in part because it lent itself so effectively with anti-establishment 
identities. There were no English respondents like this.   
Leaving this case aside, the other respondents say nothing about race, immigration or ethnicity. It 
would therefore be a gross mis-characterisation to impute strongly nationalist or racist views to this 
cluster. However, the fact that respondents seldom strongly oppose racism could mean that such 
views might be elicited by a certain kind of discursive populism which articulates a strongly anti-
establishment discourse. And indeed, in the political vacuum of the years after 2008, when the 
political parties embraced a quasi-austerity politics and moved to the centre ground, this is exactly 
what became possible.  
 
4c: Mastery of multiculturalism 
There is a third set of repertoires which is entirely associated with the cultural elite (see Table 4). 
Here we see the strongest and most elaborated anti-racist articulations. On probing their qualitative 
interviews, it becomes clear that these values come from practical experiences associated with a 
certain kind of ‘mastery’ by which the respondent tackles intolerance, racism, and parochialism, 
either in the course of their work, or in their personal experiences. For several white well educated 
professionals this is associated with issues around ‘managing diversity’ which they experience in 
their working lives. Such respondents tend not to be as linear or economically successful as those 
who articulate imperial nationalism, and they tend to work in the public sector. P61 was strongly 
academically oriented, with a sociology degree who became a management trainee, and went into 
business administration. She went busking, played music (and was keen attendee at Glastonbury), 
hiked, belonged to reading group, was a keen cook and belonged to environmental movement. She 
had been research officer for housing Association and strongly embraced diversity as part of her 
professional ethos.  
------ Table 4 about here ----- 
P61’s anti-racist identity intersected strongly with her confidence and assertiveness. Along with her 
pride in her approach – ‘I did a lot of equality and diversity stuff at work….I used to like that…’ came 
a pleasure in trying on different identities for herself 
I tell you what I used to call myself at work--, I was a part time mad vegetarian cycling 
mum…. I think I used to call myself mad because I don’t think I fit--, I think I was a bit of a 
square peg in a round hole.  And now… I’m a round peg in a round hole…. I hate thinking it 
but I think I’m turning into a Guardian reader…. yes I think, you know, The Guardian is the 
paper that defines us. (P61) 
For P444, a strong and articulate anti-racist and anti-imperialist view was explained in terms of how 
she had become professionally confident. Following her history degree she retrained as social 
workers.  
I mean it was quite a defining moment for me because I actually stood up to all my team 
mates and said what I thought of them.  And then I got kind of head hunted to go into a 
community team where they wanted someone with good anti-racist credentials, and believe 
it or not I did have them.  I actually was quite sound on that issue, I was working for the 
union at the time as an anti-racist officer and I knew my stuff.  So I went there and started 
actually garnering some respect in the service for bits and pieces of research that I’d done 
and the fact that I really--, I was involved in the union, I was their rep on anti-racism, so I was 
meeting the chief officers and that (P444).   
Alongside those who had embraced diversity as a managerial concern, there were also other white 
respondents who had experienced living in other nations as children and so had picked up a sense of 
what it was to be a minority. P584, now a nurse, had a strong ex-pat identity as a result of her 
childhood in Africa 
I loved all the Africans that lived round us and worked with us, I wanted to marry our 
houseboy because he was just a wonderful man, he had two wives and lots of kids already 
but I loved him to bits, and I was just knee high.  So therefore there was that immediateness 
in the upbringing of there being a difference.  Saying that, when we had to stop off in 
{COUNTRY6, Africa}, we came by boat to Britain, and we went to a bank in {PLACE6, in 
COUNTRY6, Africa}, and after a while I got fed up, went and sat down, was sitting there and 
mum comes rushing over after about ten minutes, “You’re not allowed to sit there!” “Why 
not?  No one else is sitting here, and there’s plenty of room,” that was where black people 
sat.  And it didn’t occur to me, what does it matter?  Why can’t--?  So in terms of--, there 
was at least that apartheid side of it, I knew there was a difference but there wasn’t a 
problem sitting with African people because they’re just people anyway and they’re just like 
me but they’re just a different colour.  (P584) 
It is striking here how this experience is rendered as a form of sophistication, in which the capacity 
to navigate multi-cultural experiences conveys a kind of cultural capital. This kind of cosmopolitan 
awareness is also very clearly manifest in P581, one of the few black NCDS respondents, who had 
strong memories of his arrival in England in 1972 
it was freezing, absolutely--, I’ve never seen it so cold, we didn’t even have a jumper and 
when we got there the--, I suppose they were called the social services or [volunteering] 
services or whatever, but they had--, they gave us jumpers, they gave us tea and 
sandwiches.  It’s the first time I ever had a jam sandwich, I’d never ever had a jam sandwich, 
I didn’t know what it was, it was gorgeous, it was lovely. (P581)   
P581 trained as a flight engineer and worked his way up to become a manager, working in Asia, and 
had a highly reflexive view of international affairs and Britain’s role in it. Proudly identifying as 
British East African Asian, he said  
I feel very bad when people tend to do things which are hurtful to anybody who is British.  
Because it could be me or my daughters or my son, you know, and I don’t see that is right, I 
don’t think that is right.  I mean, I disagree with a lot of the things that the government have 
done which is like any other government, everybody has their choice of that.  I was against 
the war in Iraq, I did not feel that we were given the right facts which was proved, we were 
not given the right facts, I think we will probably have a lot more deaths in Afghanistan 
because that is a terrible area, it’s a terrible uncontrolled area and we’re sending some very, 
very young lads out there.  I mean, I work--, I see them--, in fact, on Monday, I’m going there 
myself and I see these young lads and I feel very, very sad that it could be my son, you know, 
and he is somebody’s son, it’s not could be, it is somebody’ son.  And we’re putting them in 
a situation where this is all political moves. And we’re putting lives at risk, young lives which 
they will not achieve anything, I don’t think in the long term they will achieve anything 
there, those people are crazy, you know.  If we could build a wall which was 25 feet high 
around it, I think that would be better than sending our young lads there, personally.  (P581) 
We can see that this set of repertoires is associated with those who have managed multicultural 
experiences in their lives, either personally or professionally, which has given them a sense of 
confidence and ‘mastery’ which has been internalised as part of their identity, all the more so as 
they have enjoyed successful careers. This association with a managerial and professional habitus is 
an important feature of these respondents’ views, but its association with cultural elite positions is 
important to recognise. This kind of confidence and ‘ease’ might be offputting to those who feel 
distrustful or suspicious of these hierarchies and who feel a lack of mastery - i.e. precisely the kinds 
of sentiments articulated in our ‘disenfranchised’ cluster. This kind of internalisation of anti-racism, 
by being located in specific social locations, has the potential to generate oppositions from those in 
other social positions    
‘ 
5: Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have reflected on the contemporary significance of white racism and its association 
with nationalist sentiment amongst a cohort late middle aged white Britons. We have drawn 
attention to the instabilities and diversity of racist responses. There is an interesting parallel here 
with debates around cultural capital (e.g. Bennett et al 2009; Savage et al 2015). Just as it has been 
argued that there is no unitary kind of cultural capital, with ‘emerging’ cultural capital disputing the 
snobbish ‘highbrow’ version (but nonetheless exemplifies its own versions of elitism), so old forms of 
imperial nationalism are challenged by more populist forms which do not necessarily see Britain as 
superior, and which associate nationalism with personal, familial, attachments. On this basis, we can 
pull out several important issues which are important to draw into the current debate about 
nationalist populism. 
Our first point is methodological. Given the intense difficulties in measuring racism, given its often 
‘underground’ character, we see our mixed methods approach as vital. Our purely quantitative 
analysis of NCDS survey responses might not by itself suggest that racism was a major issue. 
However, we have shown that there are some distinctive features of the survey responses (notably 
the differences between ‘strongly’ and ‘merely’ agreeing to anti-racist questions (or disagreeing to 
racist ones) which suggest a more circumspect interpretation.  And we can also see how the 
qualitative interviews throw up much more nuance to our interpretation and in particular allow us to 
relate racist refrains to nationalist politics more effectively than when a range of attitudes are 
arrayed into some kind of scale.  
This leads onto our second point. Whilst there was only a very limited amount of overt and direct 
racism, as measured by NCDS questions, the qualitative evidence reveals a significant majority who 
appear ambivalent or uncertain about their views, and only an (admittedly substantial) minority give 
clear and emphatic anti-racist responses to survey questions. Our further analysis suggests that 
those who only mildly support anti-racist (or mildly dissent from anti-racist) statements tend to be 
dispersed from those who are more emphatically anti-racist. We thus see the major divide between 
those who are universally committed to racial equity, and those who are ambivalent, with the latter 
group being potentially liable to being mobilised into more racist politics – as arguably has indeed 
happened in the UK in recent years. 
Thirdly, we have disputed the class centric view that it is predominantly the ‘white working class’, or 
the ‘left behinds’ who are more attracted to racist politics. This is a popular media argument, often 
allied to a certain kind of condescension (famously represented in Labour MP Emily Thornbury’s 
‘snobby’ tweet of a working class house with emblematic white van parked outside and English 
flags), that nationalist populism and racism is predominantly a working class phenomenon. Although 
on the face of it, working class respondents appear more racist according to their survey responses, 
this is not evident from their qualitative interviews (where issues of race are hardly mentioned). By 
contrast, it is those with high amounts of economic (and sometimes cultural) capital who evoke a 
vision of ‘imperial nationalism’ which can intersect along with racist sentiments. We need to 
recognise, therefore, that significant amounts of racism and what we have termed imperial 
nationalism is associated with advantaged social groups. Our cluster of disadvantaged Britons who in 
2008 were generally ambivalent about nationalism and it was their anti-establishment feelings 
which were more strongly held. This explains why Scottish nationalism was strong amongst this 
group since this was a means of articulating anti-establishment feelings in nationalist form.   
Fourthly, therefore we do not think it helpful to see a unitary kind of nationalist or racist framing 
amongst our cohort of Britons, and we need to deconstruct different conceptions of nationalism and 
racism if we are to understand the complex politics of populism today. We can, however speculate, 
that the dynamics we have revealed here help explain the Brexit vote amongst more disadvantaged 
populations. We should remind ourselves that our fieldwork took place in 2008. The subsequent 
construction of the European Union by UKIP as some kind of extra-national ‘Establishment’ made it 
possible for the anti-establishment nationalism of the ‘disenfranchised’ to stage an alliance with the 
imperial nationalism of the economic elite. However, and this is our main point, this alliance is 
fraught and is not necessarily resilient – as indeed more recent political events, notably the 2017 
General Election results, have already shown. There remains a high likelihood that there will be a 
political fracture in the temporary Brexit alliance between members of our disenfranchised and elite 
clusters.   
Fifthly, a ‘universalist’ politics of racial equity as such also tends to be allied with those in 
advantaged positions, where indeed ‘managing diversity’ is a marker of effective and skilful 
‘mastery’ (to use a Bourdieusian term). This matters for two main reasons: (a) it plays into tensions 
amongst the advantaged groups between those committed to racial equity and those wedded to 
more imperial conceptions, in which disadvantaged groups, with their anti-establishment sentiment, 
may well not be heard in the ensuing debate, so feeding into their further sense of being 
marginalised; and (b) because certain kinds of universalist anti-racist repertoires are associated with 
those in senior managerial and professional positions, this might run the risk of creating backlash 
from those in more marginal positions. Overt anti-racist repertoires are themselves loaded onto 
forms of domination in which those with certain kinds of cultural capital are best placed to handle 
the universalist claims. 
We therefore argue that a major underpinning of contemporary nationalism amongst disadvantaged 
groups is that it has become the main ‘legitimate’ way in which anti-establishment sentiment can be 
manifested. It can, therefore, be seen as associated with the decline of overt ‘class politics’. 
Nationalism, and linked forms of racist and anti-immigrant sentiment, is the main way by which anti-
establishment statements, and can thus come to carry the freight of a populist politics which is 
actually generated by deep rooted processes of domination and marginalisation. Perhaps this 
nationalism is unstable because it depends on an anti-establishment politics which could well 
ultimately clash with the national elites which lead it. In the case of the US, Donald Trump’s ability to 
position himself as anti-elite, despite his clear plutocratic position, has allowed him short term 
success. But it is not clear that this will become a long term political alignment any more than 
Theresa May’s attempt to stitch together old style upper crust Englishness with anti-elite discourse 
proved effective in the 2017 Election. It is only the capacity to identify ‘enemy’ nations or 
movements which allows these movements to persevere, but this is a fraught and contingent 
process – albeit one which suggests that political instability, associated with powerful nationalist, 
racist and class refrains is likely to be a persistent feature of the political landscape in the years to 
come.  
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Table 1: NCDS responses to three questions on racism, 2008 
 Would not want 
another race as my 
boss 
Would not mind 
working with other 
races 
Would not mind if another 
race moved in next door 
Strongly agree 1.7%       46.4% 25.4%     
Agree 2.0 33.2 40.4        
Neutral 14.8 7.5 17.5        
Disagree 31.3 1.3 4.4 
Strongly disagree 39.6 0.7 1.5 
(Missing) 10.8 10.8 10.8 
N= 9790 9790 9790 
Source: NCDS 2008 
 
  
Table 2: Imperial nationalist repertoires  
 
Sub- 
Repertories 
Cluster  Indicative quotes 
Imperial 
nationalist 
3 
Economic 
elite 
 
2 Cultural 
elite 
I would say British is a leader for a lot of things…. I think we’ve got strong 
values and it leads the way…. my friend’s married to a girl from Africa.  I 
think that that has gone a bit serious, I think it’s too serious. (P479) 
 
I watch the Olympics and things, more recently, I’ve been very pleased to 
see the British coming out well… I think we’re the best, personally 
(Feeling British….) is important…. watching (daughter) on the podium… 
and them playing the national anthem… it sends shivers down your spine, 
you know, it’s just--, it’s nice to--, to be British. Yeah… I’m quite proud to 
be British… there is--, good things about British culture….  (P1090) 
 
I think it’s generally still a very polite and ordered and fairly homogenous 
society, with some things I think people can be proud of being British for.  
We’ve done a lot of good things as a country….. (P713) 
Nostalgic 
imperial 
racism 
1 
Economic 
elite  
 
2 cultural 
elite  
 
(Wife) said all these different coloured faces, some are good, some are 
bad, I don’t know, but we’ve just lost it, and as for industry and 
government, we’ve--, it’s out the window isn’t it really?  (P740) 
 
I do take the view that in recent years we perhaps should have stood up 
more for the sort of more traditional British values. I do believe that we 
should not be giving in to some of the minorities who want us to change 
our way.  And I don’t mean that disrespectfully to any individual, but I do 
think we have traditions and standards in British life and those are I think 
sometimes being eroded by people from ethnic minorities (P607) 
 
I don’t have a problem when Muslim women working with us at all, but 
they shouldn’t be wearing veils in this country, that religious crap should 
just be got rid of, just like the French ban it, you know, it’s just stupid 
what we’re letting people get away with.  (P394) 
 
 
Source: NCDS interviews, UKDA 6691 
  
Table 3: Anti-establishment nationalist repertoires 
Sub-repertoires Clusters Indicative quotes 
Strong Scots 4 
disenfranchised 
It’s because of the way of life that we have, the scenery we 
have, we are more…. Obliging, we tend to try and help, we’re 
not the scroungers or the people that the English portray us as 
(P461) 
Strong British 1 
disenfranchised 
It’s so lovely, that’s to me being British and seeing daffodils in 
the spring and, you know, I love all that, I couldn’t live 
anywhere else, I don’t think, because of that 
Ambivalent 11 
disenfranchised 
 
2 cultural elite 
Personally I think that everyone’s the same, you know. It 
doesn’t matter in terms of race, creed or colour, if you’re born 
in this country and that’s your allegiance, you’re British… I just 
see myself as British and don’t think of I’m very patriotic at all, 
no. If they asked me to stand up tomorrow and swear 
allegiance to the queen, I don’t think I would  (P430) 
 
I’m not out with my flags waving at big royal events or anything 
like that. No, I mean… quite frankly at the moment… I’d rather 
be anywhere than England. I just think it’s the most depressing 
place (P441) 
 
Source: NCDS interviews, UKDA 6691 
  
Table 4: Mastery of multi-culturalism repertoires 
 
Sub-repertoires cluster Indicative quotes 
Managers of 
diversity 
3 
cultural 
elite 
I did a lot of equality and diversity stuff at work… it all fitted in 
beautifully, it was a black and minority ethnic led association, it was 
my thing. (P61) 
He (manager) was a terrible racist himself and he used to say the 
most outrageous things in public, sometimes in writing to people.  
And so I spent a lot of time getting people to sign compromise 
agreements so they couldn’t take us to a tribunal (P154) 
I got kind of head hunted to go into a community team in London 
where they wanted someone with good anti-racist credentials….  I 
actually was quite sound on that issue, I was working for the union 
at the time as an anti-racist officer and I knew my stuff… I’m kind of 
uncomfortable with the notion of British (P444) 
Personal mastery 
- white  
2 
cultural 
elite 
Well I was very lucky to be born and raised as a child in (Africa), 
where I felt I was an innocent child… because I was a foreigner, a 
white person living in a black country, there was that difference 
immediately.  I grew up with it without knowing anything else 
(P584) 
I’m not terribly sort of nationalistic or I don’t feel very strongly 
about those things really, no.  In some ways it is because when I 
went to Australia there was a very anti [Pom] type of feeling and a 
lot of that was tongue in cheek but some of it wasn’t…. sometimes 
you can feel a bit defensive because obviously you’re not very well 
respected in all different countries. (P254) 
Personal mastery 
– black immigrant 
experience 
1 
cultural 
elite 
I mean, obviously I’m not an English, you know, white skin guy, I 
mean, I had to work a lot harder to be where I was, to be 
recognised at my capabilities and everything, compared to 
everybody else.  And I’ve also noticed through life that a lot of the 
work that was done was never actually commended by the other 
people, whereas if it was an English guy or a white guy, it was 
always a letter to say, “Oh well done mate, you know, you’ve done 
well on this and that,” and when you turn round and say, “Hang on, 
who actually fixed this or who actually did this?”  And then you 
realise that it was just a routine for them to send it to everybody 
else…. yes I am quite happy (being British).  I was given a home here 
when nobody else wanted us anywhere, so no, no we’re British but 
I call myself a British East African Asian. (P581) 
 
Source: NCDS interviews, UKDA 6691 
                                                          
FOOTNOTES 
 
i
 See the details in 
https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=great+british+class+survey&safe=strict&espv=2&source=lnms&tbm=isch
&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiLmq7bzfjSAhWEL8AKHQp-BS4Q_AUIBygC&biw=1920&bih=974#imgrc=1222VAEN9j-
XCM: 
 
ii
 These interviews were conducted by a team of researchers led by Jane Elliott at the Centre for Longitudinal 
Studies (CLS), Institute of Education with Andrew Miles, Samantha Parsons and Mike Savage in the research 
team (Elliott et al 2012). These interviews are archived at the UK Data Archive, project 6691.   
 
iii
 Respondent numbers refer to the interview number indexed in the UKDA 6691 datalist.  
